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I. Introduction 
Already  in  the  years  preceding  the  SEA,  broad  transformations  in  the 
nature of work and economy had undermined the position of many trade 
unions  across  Western  Europe.
1    Even  in  cases  where  trade  unions 
retained  influence  with  government,  over  the  1980s  central  political 
authority was undermined as, 
 
Decisions on macroeconomic conditions were increasingly made, not in 
national policy arenas where neo-corporatist deals could be struck, but in 
intergovernmental negotiations and global markets beyond most unions’ 
control. 
2 
 
But  especially  since  the  1986  Single  European  Act  (SEA),  European 
integration  has  changed  the  environment  in  which  trade  unions  act  in 
important  ways.    In  the  past  twenty  years,  European  integration  has 
moved beyond its relatively narrow economic basis, to impact areas of key 
significance  for  trade  unions,  including  macroeconomic  policies,  social 
policies and even industrial relations.   
 
This  expansion  of  the  EU’s  competence  has  changed  the  opportunity 
structure facing the trade unions by creating both challenges as well as 
new  opportunities.    That  is  to  say  that  European  integration  has 
undermined  existing  national  trade  union  arrangements  while 
simultaneously creating a new arena of policy-making open to trade union 
influence.    While  integration  has  acted  as  a  force  for  economic 
liberalization and deregulation, it also provides for a significant amount of 
actual  and potential  re-regulation at the  European  level.   And  although 
deregulatory processes have advanced much farther than has European-
level  social  re-regulation,  the  institutionalization  of  the  European  arena 
nevertheless creates new opportunities for trade union influence.   
 
From  labor’s  viewpoint,  the  challenges  posed  by  European  integration 
include  constraints  on  the  macroeconomic  policy  autonomy  of  member 
states,  which  limits  the  ways  that  governments  can  manage  their 
economies  and  respond  to  unions'  demands.    Furthermore,  the  free 
movement  of  goods  and  services  within  an  integrated  internal  market 
means that companies can “regime shop” and, in essence, relocate to the 
state with the most favorable business conditions.  Unions fear that states 
will  compete  to  attract  mobile  capital  by  fostering  a  pro-business 
environment in which the protection of workers and the environment are 
sacrificed.  This competitive deregulation is what trade unionists refer to 
as “social dumping”. 
                                                  
1    Beginning in the 1970s, the move to post-industrialism, changes in the locus of political power 
in Western Europe, and the spread of neo-liberal ideology all contributed to the erosion of 
unions’ power, and by the 1980s trade unions were on the defensive.   
2    Ross, George, and Andrew Martin. “European Unions Face the Millennium.” In The Brave New 
World of European Labor, edited by Andrew Martin and George Ross. New York: Berhahn 
Books, 1999: 8.   2 
 
But in addition to these challenges, European integration has also opened 
up new opportunities for trade unions.  The expansion of EU authority into 
the social realm, if limited, has presented trade unions with the hope of 
checking a decades-long trend of national deregulation – in response not 
just  to  European  integration,  but  to  a  more  general  trend  of  economic 
internationalization – through European-level re-regulation.  Furthermore, 
the establishment in the 1980s and 1990s of European-level negotiations 
between the social partners (peak associations representing workers and 
employers)  has  raised  the  hopes  of  some  trade  unionists  that  a 
Europeanized  system  of  industrial  relations  by  means  of  the  social 
dialogue will lead to a re-incorporation of organized labor into economic 
management and policy-making more generally.   
 
In essence, then, European integration entices unions with the possibilities 
for  greater  economic  management,
3  countering  social  dumping,  and 
harmonizing  and  strengthening  social  policies.    Especially  under  the 
Delors  Commission,  from  the  mid-1980s  to  the  mid-1990s,  the  EU 
exhibited a willingness to innovate in the area of social policy.  As the only 
regional organization with sufficient political institutionalization to make the 
prospect of supranational social re-regulation a credible possibility,
4 the 
EU represents the ‘last best hope’ of the trade unions against the specters 
‘globalization’ and ‘Americanization’. 
 
But  while  European  integration  has  changed  the  opportunity  structure 
unions face in Europe, the question of how they have responded to these 
new challenges and opportunities has received little attention.
5  Despite 
the fact that trade unions have been – and remain! – important actors, not 
only  in  industrial  relations,  but  also  in  the  political  life  of  most  West 
European countries, few comparative responses have been attempted to 
the question of how European trade unions have adapted to economic 
integration and the institutionalization of European-level politics. 
 
Instead,  when  assessing  the  impact  of  the  EU  on  European  labor,  the 
focus has been on the evolution of the European-level peak association of 
labor, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) rather than on 
national  unions  and  confederations.    Founded  in  1973,  the  ETUC  was 
given in a major boost by Delors’ enthusiasm for the principles of social 
partnership and social dialogue.  As a result, since the late 1980s, the 
ETUC  has  represented  workers  in  bargaining  and  tripartite  forums, 
                                                  
3   However, the ECB is bound by treaty to pursue price stability above all other goals, including 
full employment. 
4    Martin writes that, “internationalization [in Europe] has taken a distinctive form.  Political 
institutions have been created which have a capacity to control the process of international 
economic integration that is greater than in any other region”.  See also Ross & Martin, 1999: 
6. 
5    Although see introduction and conclusion of Martin & Ross, 1999.   3 
alongside  the  European  peak  employers’  associations  (UNICE  and 
CEEP).   
 
The  formation  of  the  ETUC  might  seem  to  bear  out  early  the 
neofunctionalist  prediction  from  the  1950s  that,  “the  unions  have  no 
alternative but to unite in seeking to influence supranational authorities.”
6  
But in reality, the ETUC is far from being a unified movement capable of 
wielding its influence over employers and the political institutions of the 
EU.    Instead,  internal  divisions  loom  large  as  the  ETUC’s  member 
confederations continue to pull the ETUC in different directions.  These 
national confederations, in short, cannot agree on a common European 
strategy to advance workers’ interests.  There may be an imperative for 
unions to unite in order to exert greater influence at the European level, 
but  at  the  same  time  European  integration  has  fostered  a  real  tension 
within the labor movement about what “Europe” means for workers.  As a 
result, the ETUC remains fragmented.  Unions increasingly recognize the 
importance of the European arena, but they are unable to agree on what 
the  appropriate  strategy  is  for  pursuing  workers’  interests  within  that 
arena. 
 
The  focus  in  this  paper  is  not  on  the  ETUC,  but  on  its  members,  the 
national  confederations.
7    The  purpose  is  to  develop  a  framework  for 
understanding and comparing their different European strategies – that is, 
the different  ways  that  national  confederations  use  the  EU arena.   We 
need to look at both the objectives that they pursue as well as the means 
that they use to advance those goals, for unions’ strategies vary in both of 
these areas.   
 
Should trade unions support the European integration project as a buffer 
against the global economy, or is the EU itself a force for liberalization that 
should be opposed?  Should organized labor act at the European level as 
an interest group or as a protest movement?  Understanding how unions 
answer these question is the key to understanding why they pursue the 
specific European strategies they do.  The problem for the ETUC is that 
national  confederations  respond  in  different  ways  to  those  basic 
questions; this paper attempts to explain why they do. 
 
II. Variation in trade unions’ European strategies 
We  can  think  of  unions’  European  strategies  as  being  defined  by  two 
different factors: the objectives they pursue at the European level, and the 
                                                  
6   Haas, Ernest. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958: 388.     
7    I focus on national trade union confederations rather than on the individual unions which 
comprise them, because it is the confederations that have typically been responsible for 
dealing with international issues, and it is the confederations rather than the individual unions 
that affiliate to the ETUC.  Also, even though there are important differences among the 
confederations they are much more comparable units of analysis than are the individual unions 
and federations which affiliate to them.   4 
means with which they pursue them.  What I argue in this paper is that a 
union’s  European  objectives  are  determined  by  its  assessment  of  the 
costs  and  benefits  of  EU  policies,  and  those  costs  and  benefits  are 
shaped  by  domestic  institutions  which  vary  from  country  to  country.  
Specifically,  differences  in  national  labor  market  regulations  and  public 
service provisions mean that European developments impact the unions 
differently.  They key element in explaining the difference in unions’ tactics 
at the European level is the institutional variation among the trade unions 
themselves.  The tactics that each union chooses for pursuing its interests 
at the European level are largely a function of institutionalized repertoires 
of action that were developed within the national setting.  In other words, 
unions are bound by their own legacies; they act at the European level 
using the tools that they developed within the domestic arena. 
 
On the basis of a textual analysis of unions’ reports, congress documents 
and press, unions’ objectives can be classified in terms of two ideal types, 
which  I  call  constructive  and  defensive.    Unions  with  constructive 
objectives seek to build up new areas of competence at the supranational 
level.  In general, these unions tend to see the EU as at least a potential, if 
not  yet  an  actual,  shield  against  the  neo-liberal  international  economy.  
Unions  with  a  constructive  orientation  see  positive  integration  as  the 
answer  to  the  challenges  they  face.    On  the  other  hand,  unions  with 
defensive European objectives seek to protect the national arena from the 
potentially  negative  effects  of  European  integration.    In  general,  these 
unions  see  integration  as  a  force  of  globalization,  rather  than  a  buffer 
against it.   
 
I  use  the  term  ‘tactics’  to  refer  to  the  program  of  action  that  a  union 
pursues to advance its European goals – the term refers to how unions 
use the European arena.  To classify the unions’ tactics I have relied on 
the unions’ own reports of their activities, as well as interviews with trade 
union  officials  in  Brussels  and  the  national  capitals,  interviews  with 
representatives  of  the  EU  political  institutions,  and  media  reports  on 
popular  demonstrations.    These  different  forms  of  influence  can  be 
conceptualized  as  two  ideal  types,  which  I  call  institutionalized  and 
activist.    Unions  that  seek  influence  by  forging  relationships  with  the 
European political institutions, in order to exert pressure over the policy-
making  process,  can be  said  to  pursue  institutionalized  tactics.    These 
unions tend to approach the EU as interest groups.  On the other hand, 
unions  that  focus  more  on  periodic  mobilization  –  for  example,  in 
European demonstrations – can be said to rely on more activist tactics.  In 
general, they tend to approach the EU more as protest movements than 
as interest groups.  European strategies, then, can be classified into four 
separate ideal types: 
   5 
Figure 1: Variation in European Strategies: Ideal Types 
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This paper focuses specifically on the different strategies that the British 
TUC  and  the  French  CGT  have  staked  out  with  regard  to  European 
integration.    These  two  cases  make  for  an  interesting  comparison 
because,  until  the  late  1980s,  they  shared  a  similarly  explicit  anti-
European  position.    Then,  between  the  late  1980s  and  the  mid-1990s, 
each dispensed with its long-held opposition to EU politics and staked out 
a specific European strategy.  Essentially, the two unions were responding 
to  the  same  European-level  environment:  the  re-launch  of  integration 
spurred by the 1986 SEA and the 1991 Maastricht Treaty.  Despite that, 
the  European  strategies  adopted  by  the  two  unions  are  quite  different.  
This is true both in terms of the objectives each confederation has laid out 
for itself, as well as the means used to pursue those objectives. 
 
In terms of European objectives, the TUC seeks to build up new areas of 
competence  at  the  supranational  level  while  the  CGT  is  unwilling  to 
countenance the sorts of constraints on national sovereignty this would 
imply.  The TUC seeks to push forward European-level social programs 
which  will  provide  tangible  benefits  for  British  workers:  its  orientation 
towards Europe is ‘constructive’ in the sense that it seeks to achieve its 
goals through the construction of a new body of European-level policies.  
The CGT, on the other hand, seeks to protect French social regulations 
from EU-induced liberalization; it specifically seeks to inhibit the creation 
of  new  policies  at  the  European  level  which  might  produce  negative 
results for French workers.  The orientation of the CGT towards Europe, 
then, can be seen as ‘defensive’.   
 
In addition to differing over objectives, the TUC and the CGT also differ in 
the ways that they have pursued their goals at the European level.  The 
TUC  has  established  an  office  in  Brussels  charged  with  establishing 
relationships  with  the  political  institutions  of  the  EU  in  order  to  gather 
information and to project the TUC’s position.  The goal is to help the TUC 
both to shape and to better respond to European policies.  The CGT, on 
the  other  hand,  has  no  institutionalized  relationships  with  the  political 
institutions  of  the  EU  and  has  no  permanent  presence  in  Brussels.  
However,  in  periodic  demonstrations  to  support  trade  union  demands 
related  to  EU  policies,  the  CGT  consistently  mobilizes  at  much  higher 
levels than other trade unions.  In short, the two unions use very different   6 
tactics  in  their  attempts  to  shape  European  policies:  the TUC  engages 
with  the  EU  in a  way  that  we  can  call  ‘institutionalized’  while  the  CGT 
engages in a manner that we can call ‘activist’.   
 
One might wonder, at this point, whether constructively-oriented unions 
simply  engage  with  Europe  in  a  more  institutionalized  manner  while 
defensively-oriented  unions  get  by  with  less  institutionalized  tactics.  
Intuitively, this line of reasoning is quite plausible, especially given that the 
decision-making structure of the EU makes the creation of new European-
level  policies  (positive  integration)  much  more  difficult  than  the  striking 
down  of  national  policies  which  inhibit  the  free  functioning  Common 
Market (negative integration).
8  One might expect that a more sustained 
effort  may  be  required  to  pursue  constructive  rather  than  defensive 
objectives. 
 
However, the relationship between means and ends is not that simple, as 
two shadow cases make clear.  I find that the German DGB shares many 
of the defensive goals of the CGT, but it uses tactics that are different from 
the CGT’s.  In fact, the DGB pursues its objectives in an institutionalized 
manner that is much closer to the way the TUC pursues its goals.  And the 
Italian CGIL, which shares the TUC’s constructive objectives in Europe, 
uses activist tactics that more closely resemble the CGT’s actions.  The 
unions’  choice  about  which  tactics  to  use  to  exert  influence  at  the 
European level depends more on the union’s institutional structure and 
legacies  than  on  their  European  objectives.    Despite  their  different 
European objectives, the TUC and DGB on the one hand, and the CGT 
and CGIL on the other, share important institutional parallels that shape 
the ways that they engage politically, both at the European level as well as 
at the domestic.  We can classify the four unions’ European strategies in 
terms of the four ideal-types previously defined: 
 
Figure 2: European Strategies of the TUC, CGT, DGB and CGIL 
  Objectives 
 
  constructive  defensive 
institutionalized   
TUC 
 
 
DGB 
T
a
c
t
i
c
s
 
 
 
activist 
 
CGIL 
 
CGT 
 
 
                                                  
8   Streeck, Wolfgang. “From Market Making to State Building? Reflections on the Political 
Economy of European Social Policy.” In European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and 
Integration, edited by Stephan Liebfried and Paul Pierson. Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995.   7 
III. Trade union objectives in Europe 
It is not surprising that trade unions throughout the EU generally support 
the  same  basic  goal  with  regard  to  European  integration:  the 
establishment of a “social Europe” to counter-balance the liberal economic 
space that has been created.  Further, there is an unstartling consensus 
that the creation of European-level social standards should represent a 
“leveling-up” of national standards rather than a “race to the bottom”.  But 
beyond  these  very  general  goals,  the  specific  objectives  that  national 
confederations  actively  pursue  within  the  European  context  differ  in 
important  ways.    For  instance,  the  TUC  sees  European-level 
developments  as  a  catalyst  for  change  in  domestic  labor  relations.    In 
particular, it hopes that coordination with and strengthening of the ETUC 
will help it to import to Britain a system of coordinated labor relations more 
in line with the Continental model.  On the other hand, the DGB actively 
tries  to  prevent  European  developments  from  reorganizing  German 
industrial relations.  In particular, it has sought to replicate the German 
system  of  labor  organization  at  the  European  level,  actively  opposing 
attempts to strengthen the sectoral federations (EIFs) within the ETUC. 
 
But why do unions pursue different objectives  within the context of the 
EU?  I argue that these different objectives are the result of the ways the 
unions  calculate  the  costs  and  benefits  of  European  integration.  
Differences  in national  systems  of  social  provision  and  labor  regulation 
mean that the effects of European integration are not distributed evenly 
across the unions – they don’t all shoulder the same burden, nor do they 
all reap equal benefits.  The rolling-back of British social services since the 
1980s  means  that  many  of  the  unions’  post-war  achievements  were 
curtailed  or  done  away  with  entirely.    The  dissolution  of  the  NEDC,  in 
particular,  struck  a  blow  to  the  TUC’s  influence  over  national  policy-
making.
9  On the other hand, the resiliency of the French system of social 
benefits – complex as it is – means that the CGT’s main struggle is to 
prevent  the  sort  of  retrenchment  that  has  occurred  in  so  many  other 
countries. 
 
These domestic-level differences shape the ways that the TUC and the 
CGT understand the challenges and benefits of European integration, and 
thus  their  orientation  towards  the  EU.    The  TUC  seeks  to  construct 
European-level  competences  in  areas  of  social  provision  where 
successive British governments have refused to yield ground, while the 
CGT  seeks  to  protect  France’s  high  levels  of  public  services  from 
downward leveling, taking a defensive position against the pressures of 
European  integration.    The  TUC’s  European  orientation  is  constructive 
and the CGT’s is defensive. 
                                                  
9   The NEDC was the most important of the tripartite bodies established in Britain during the 
1960s and 1970s.  Through it, the TUC played an important role in shaping public and social 
policy.  Under the Thatcher government,   the Council was increasingly marginalized and it 
was done away with entirely by the Major government in 1992.   8 
 
Let’s look a little closer at what those terms mean in practice.  Since 1988 
the TUC has sought to use the EU arena to improve working conditions for 
British workers.  In the face of government intransigence at the domestic 
level, even modest efforts in Brussels to extend social legislation, regulate 
working conditions, and grant trade unions a role in policy-making have 
been seized upon with gusto.  As one TUC officer put it: “had it not been 
for the EU during the Thatcher period, any notion of expanding trade union 
rights would have gone out the window.”
10  Even after the Labour Party 
gained  office  in  1997,  the  EU  has  remained  an  important  focus  of  the 
TUC’s agenda.   
 
To assess the orientation  and objectives  of  the TUC  towards  Europe  I 
reviewed the union’s press releases over the fifteen years from 1990-2005 
along  with  its  annual  Congress  documents  for  the  period  from  1988-
2005.
11  Although there are certainly instances when the TUC is critical of 
aspects  of  European  integration,  the  aggregate  portrait  that  these 
materials depict is of an EU that delivers real benefits to British workers.  
More often, when European-level activities receive negative attention, the 
focus is on the role of the British government in obstructing, delaying or 
failing to implement EU legislation properly.
12  The TUC actively touts EU 
activities with triumphant proclamations like, “Millions of [British] workers 
have the European Union to thank for the right to take an extra week’s 
paid  holiday…”,
13  and  the  European  directive  on  worker  consultation 
represents,  “a  once  in  a  lifetime  opportunity  to  modernize  the 
workplace.”
14  
 
Over  the  1990s,  the  EU  came  to  occupy  an  important  position  in  the 
TUC’s  action  programs.    In  its  1992  Congress  Report,  the  TUC  listed 
“Europe” as one of its six top priorities for the period 1992-94.
15 
 
                                                  
10    Interview with TUC Collective Employment Rights & Dispute Resolution officer, London, 
January 2004. 
11    I rely on press releases because the TUC, unlike the CGT, did not have a regular publication 
during this period which it could use to disseminate its views.  In the case of the CGT I have 
relied on its twice-monthly publication Le Peuple along with Congress documents. 
12   See, e.g., the following TUC press releases: “Government should ‘think again’ on working time 
changes…”, August 20, 1999; “Temporary workers could miss out on equal rights”, August 10, 
2001; “Listen to tales of abuse from UK temps and act, TUC urges ministers”, October 12, 
2005; “Workers must be paid for Parental Leave”, November 6, 1998; “Time for sensible 
compromise on working time”, May 9, 2005; “Student temps could miss out on equal rights”, 
September 9, 2001. 
13   “Workers to get more holiday thanks to Europe”, TUC press release, November 23, 1999. 
14   “European Directive is ‘a once in a lifetime opportunity to modernise the workplace’”, TUC 
press release, January 16, 2003. 
15   The six foci being: (i) campaign for full employment; (ii) promoting an employee’s charter; (iii) 
lobbying on the forthcoming Trade Union Bill; (iv) Europe; (v) Developing services related to 
trade union education, health and safety, equal rights; (vi) Planning the inter-union future.  
TUC General Council Report 1992: 7.   9 
Reviewing  the  TUC’s  congress  documents  for  the  period  from  1988  to 
2005, I found that the TUC undertook no fewer than nineteen campaigns 
that  had  a  European-level  focus.
16    Of  these,  three  in  particular  have 
dominated the TUC’s European agenda: working time, irregular and part-
time work, and the minimum wage.  In each of these areas, the TUC has 
sought  to  expand  workers’  rights  by  advancing  EU  regulations  that  go 
beyond UK standards. 
 
This is quite different from what we see in the CGT’s press and congress 
documents.  Over the same period that the TUC publicly welcomed the 
EU’s role in extending paid holiday,
17 parental leave,
18 worker consultation 
rights
19, and rights for atypical workers,
 20 the CGT was sounding caution 
over  EU  policies  related  to  monetary  union,
21  public  service 
deregulation,
22 and the insulation of the European Central Bank.
23  Unlike 
the TUC’s emphasis on extending EU legislation, the CGT’s emphasis is 
on circumscribing the increasingly important role of the EU in French life. 
 
This is not simply a case of persistent Euro-skepticism on the part of the 
French  confederation  –  after  all,  the  TUC  had  itself  been  vehemently 
opposed to the European project for decades before reorienting only a few 
years  before  the  CGT  itself  did  so.    Rather,  the  explanation  for  the 
different orientations that these two unions have staked out with regard to 
the  EU  is  based  on  variations  between  British  and  French  regimes for 
worker protection and social services provisions.  These differences lead 
the two unions to calculate the costs and benefits of EU developments in 
quite different ways and, based on this calculation of interests, the TUC 
and the CGT pursue very different European-level agendas.  
 
In order to understand why the two unions calculate the costs and benefits 
of European integration differently we need to look at how the effects of 
EU politics play out differently in the British and French settings. 
 
                                                  
16   Among other things, these programs have included: establishing greater ties with Continental 
unions, strengthening the role of the ETUC in policy-making, British adoption of the Euro, 
establishing European Works Councils in British companies, and strengthening and extending 
worker protections. 
17   “Holiday right extended to 4 weeks from Tuesday”, TUC press release, November 22, 1999; 
“Workers to get more holiday thanks to Europe”, TUC press release, November 23, 1999. 
18   “Parental leave briefing”, TUC press release, April 25, 2001. 
19   “TUC welcomes draft EU consultation directive”, TUC press release, November 11, 1998. 
20   “TUC welcomes proposed EU Directive on temps”, TUC press release, February 18, 2002; 
“TUC comment on court victory for agency teachers”, TUC press release, January 14, 2004. 
21   CGT. “La CGT et le passage à l’euro”, Le Peuple: July 11, 2001: 33-35.  CGT. “Regards 
croisés sur l’euro”, Le Peuple: September 26, 2001.  CGT. “L’euro après Dublin: Les 
problèmes accumulés”, Le Peuple: January 15, 1997: 31-34. 
22   CGT. “Services publics et Europe”, Le Peuple: July 10, 2002.  CGT. “2004: Quel projet 
Européen?” Le Peuple: January 14, 2004: 19.  CGT. “Vers un charter européenne des 
services publics”, Le Peuple: October 25, 2000: 14. 
23   CGT. “Quelle Banque centrale pour les citoyens?”, Le Peuple: December 17, 2003.   10 
Key areas of EU policy for trade unions 
Both economic and social policies of the EU have impacted the way that 
unions  understand  their  interests  and, by  extension,  the  types of  goals 
they  set  out  to  pursue  within  Europe.    In  general,  social  policies  have 
taken  a  back  seat  to  the  Single  Market  project  over  the  course  of  EU 
history, but European-level developments, especially since the 1986 SEA 
have  had  important  effects  for  workers  –  but  those  effects  vary  from 
country to country.  As a result, the same European-level developments 
weigh very differently on the TUC and the CGT.  
 
In  terms  of  social  developments,  the main  areas  of  EU  influence  have 
been in the areas of worker health and safety, worker participation and 
representation, employment rights, and working conditions.  Each of these 
areas will be considered in turn, with an emphasis on showing the different 
effects of these developments for the TUC and CGT. 
 
Health and safety 
Among the social policy areas that EU has developed, health and safety 
was the earliest.  It was mentioned in the early treaties and established in 
EC law in the 1970s.  Under the SEA, the area of health and safety was 
given QMV status, meaning that unanimity in the Council was no longer 
required to pass legislation.  In essence, this removes the de facto veto 
held by each member state over legislation in this area.  Article 118a of 
the  SEA  called  for  improvements  in  and  harmonization  of  health  and 
safety conditions in the member states, and in 1989 a framework directive 
was passed which prompted a flurry of related ‘daughter’ directives.
24 
 
Even before the 1989 framework directive (89/391/EEC), both Britain and 
France already had well-developed national systems of health and safety 
protection for workers.  The British Health and Safety at Work Act was 
introduced in 1974.  It established several institutions, jointly composed of 
employers and workers, to promote, regulate and oversee both industrial 
safety and worker health and safety.
25  Interestingly, this is the one major 
social  realm  that  Thatcher  never  significantly  restructured.    In  France, 
general working conditions are spelled out in the labor code.  Furthermore, 
workplace-level  Committees  for  Health,  Safety  and  Working  Conditions 
with privileged access to company information and consultative rights are 
compulsory in firms with more than fifty employees.  Because workers in 
both countries are covered by strong national systems of health and safety 
protection,  EU  legislation  in  this  area  has  generally  supported  existing 
domestic regulations and has not added significant new benefits for either 
British or French workers.  The other areas of EU social policy innovation, 
                                                  
24   Geyer, Robert. Exploring European Social Policy. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2000: 72-80. 
25   Most important among these institutions are the Health and Safety Commission, which 
regulates specific issue areas; the Health and Safety Executive, which enforces health and 
safety legislation; and the firm-level Safety Committees, which employers are obligated to form 
at the request of plant trade union Safety Representatives (often shop stewards).   11 
however,  have  created  very  different  sets  of  opportunities  for  the  two 
unions. 
 
Worker participation and representation 
European legislation on the information and consultation of workers was 
first attempted in the 1970s as a part of a broad Social Action Program, 
but it was not successfully enacted until the 1990s.  In the 1980s, the 
controversial  Vredeling  Directive  was  proposed,  which  would  have 
required large companies to provide biannual reports to their workforce, 
sharing,  among  other  things,  information  about  the  firm’s  financial 
situation,  production  strategies  and  investment activities.    The  proposal 
was  repeatedly  vetoed  by  the  UK  through  the  1980s  and  early  1990s, 
even after its most controversial features had been watered down. 
 
After the UK’s 1993 veto, the Commissioner for Social Affairs sought to 
use the Social Protocol attached to the Maastricht Treaty to circumvent 
Thatcher’s  resistance  to  worker  consultation  rights.
26    The  procedure 
outlined  in  the  Protocol  required  repeated consultations  with  the  Social 
Partners  (European  peak  associations  of  employers  and  trade  unions) 
before  the  proposal  could  be  voted  on  in  the  Council  by  the  eleven 
signatories of the Protocol.
27  The employers’ associations twice refused 
the  proposal  but,  in  the  end,  the  Social  Council  approved  it.
28    This 
European  Works  Councils  Directive  (94/45/EC)  requires  that  large 
multinational firms doing business in at least two EU member states form 
a European Works Council (EWC) and establish procedures for informing 
and consulting with employee representatives.
29 
 
The benefits to workers (and unions) of the EWC directive accrue very 
differently in Britain and France.  In Britain, deregulation and liberalization 
over the decade and a half prior to the directive’s passage strengthened 
the position of employers vis-à-vis workers.  The TUC strongly supported 
the EWC directive as a means of bolstering the position of workers, as 
well as the representation and influence of the unions, within multinational 
companies.
30   While  there  was  some  trade  union  skepticism  about  the 
potential  effectiveness  of  the  EWCs,
31  the  TUC  fought  to  ensure  that 
British companies were not excluded from the directive despite the British 
                                                  
26   Since the UK had opted out of the Protocol, it did not vote on, and was not subject to, 
legislation which derived from its procedures. 
27   With the exception of the UK, all of the then-twelve EU member states were signatories of the 
Social Protocol.  They were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. 
28   Britain was not involved since it had not signed the Protocol; Portugal abstained.  
29   The directive applies to companies with more that 1000 employees, doing business in two EU 
countries, and employing more than 150 workers in each country.  The law applies equally to 
European firms and firms from third countries employing at least 150 workers in more than one 
member state. 
30   EIRO. “UK Report for Comparative Supplement on EWCs.”  (1998). 
31   Unlike much of Continental Europe, the UK had no history of any such structures of worker 
representation.   12 
opt-out.  In a survey conducted on behalf of the TUC in 97 multinational 
corporations  with  EWCs,  of  which  36  were  UK-based,  UK  respondents 
were  more  enthusiastic  than  their  non-UK  counterparts  about  the 
usefulness  of  the  EWCs  for  understanding  the  company  and  for 
exchanging ideas and information.
32 
 
While the EWC directive introduced a new form of worker representation 
into the UK, in a period when worker representation had been increasingly 
constrained for a decade and a half, the directive did not add anything 
substantively new to the French system of labor representation.  In fact, 
the rights conferred by the directive fall short of the consultation rights of 
pre-existing national works committees.  While the EWC directive defines 
consultation  rights  as,  the  “exchange  of  views  and  establishment  of 
dialogue”, the consultation rights of French national committees are much 
more  stringent.    The  committees  have  a  right  to  prior  information  and 
consultation on a large number of issues and must be consulted “in due 
time” in case of collective redundancies.
33   
 
Employment rights 
Dating from the 1970s, two directives created explicit employment rights 
for  European  workers.    The  first,  the  1975  Collective  Redundancies 
Directive  (75/129/EEC),  requires  consultation  with  workers’ 
representatives  before  redundancies  are  carried  out.    The  second,  the 
1977 Transfer of Undertakings Directive (77/187/EEC),
34 protects workers’ 
rights during takeovers and mergers.  Under this second directive, in such 
situations,  employment  relationships  are  automatically  transferred  from 
the old to the new employer.  Workers are protected from dismissal solely 
on basis of the transfer (although they can still be dismissed on general 
economic  or  performance  grounds).    The  directive  also  requires 
employers to inform and consult the workers’ representatives in the firm 
about the upcoming transfer. 
 
As in the case of the EWCs, the European employment directives yielded 
tangible benefits for British workers while creating few, if any, new rights 
for French workers.  In the case of mergers and takeovers, the French 
legal system already required new employers to adopt all the rights and 
responsibilities of the old employer with regard to the existing workforce.  
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  UK,  the  employment  relationship  had 
traditionally  been  seen  as  personal  contract;  when  a  business  was 
transferred, all contracts were therefore dissolved and the new employer 
could choose whether to re-establish them or not.  Faced with the Transfer 
of  Undertakings  Directive,  in  the  1980s,  Thatcher’s  Conservative 
government first delayed implementation, then failed to fully implement it.  
                                                  
32   EIRO. “UK Report for Comparative Supplement on EWCs.”  (1998). 
33   EIRO. “The Impact of EWC - the French Case.”  (1998). 
34   This is also known as the Acquired Rights Directive.   13 
In  1993  Britain  was  taken  to  the  ECJ  for  its  failure  to  implement  the 
directive, and has since fully implemented it, thus creating new rights for 
British workers in the event of company mergers or takeovers. 
 
Working conditions 
There are five main EU directives related to working conditions.  Again, all 
of them brought benefits to British workers but added little of substance 
beyond  what  had  already  existed  in  French  labor  law.    First,  the  1992 
Pregnant  Workers  Directive  (92/85/EEC)  requires  employers  to  assess 
health  and  safety  risks  for  pregnant  workers,  to  establish  strategies  to 
avoid such risks, and to inform employees of the risks and the steps taken 
to mitigate them.  It also establishes that pregnant workers are not obliged 
to work at night, shall be given time off for prenatal exams, and shall be 
entitled  to  fourteen  weeks’  maternity  leave,  during  which  they  will  be 
protected  from  dismissal.    The  UK  opposed  the  directive  but,  as  a 
‘daughter  directive’  of  the  SEA’s  Art.  118a  Framework  Agreement  on 
Health and Safety, it was subject to QMV and the directive passed over 
British objections. 
 
Second,  the  1993  Working  Time  Directive  (93/104/EC)  mandates  a 
minimum daily rest period of eleven hours, a rest break in any workday 
longer than six hours, a workweek of not more than forty-eight hours, and 
–  most  controversially  –  four  weeks  of  annual  paid  leave.    It  further 
recommends that night work not exceed eight hours per twenty-four hour 
period  and  that  night  workers  receive  free  health  assessments  and  be 
transferred to day work if their health is being negatively affected.
35 
 
The  other  three  directives  are  all  based  on  agreements  by  the  Social 
Partners.    The  first,  on  Parental  Leave  (96/34/EC),  was  negotiated  in 
1995-96, and provides a right to a minimum of three months’ leave for 
childbirth or family emergency.  The Commission proposed the Atypical 
Workers Directive (97/81/EC), regulating working conditions for part-time, 
short-term and seasonal workers, but even under QMV, the directive was 
blocked in the Council.  However, as in the case of the EWC, Article 3 of 
the Social Protocol was invoked, and the Commission asked the Social 
Partners  to  negotiate  an  agreement.    Unlike  the  case  of  the  EWC, 
however, the negotiations were successful.  Consultations began in the 
fall of 1995 and a proposal was agreed upon in the summer of 1997.  It 
was approved by the Council in December 1997.  The Social Partners 
also negotiated an agreement on working conditions for workers on fixed-
term contracts (99/70/EC) which essentially guarantees that such workers 
will be subject to the same working conditions as permanent workers. 
 
                                                  
35   Certain categories of workers are excepted, and derogations are permitted if employers and 
workers reached a collective agreement on the subject.   14 
These directives on working conditions all fall short of pre-existing French 
social provisions but create new rights for British workers.  The Working 
Time Directive, in particular, benefits British workers.  According to Geyer, 
“British industrial relations had never developed a substantial body of legal 
regulations for working time and the regulations which it did have were 
eliminated  by  the  Conservatives  during  the  1980s.”
36  According  to  the 
TUC, the directive gives paid vacations to two million British workers who 
had  never  been  eligible  for  them  under  British  laws.    The  much  more 
generous provisions of French industrial regulation meant that the benefits 
of these directives added few, if any, new rights to the French labor code. 
 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, workers in Britain and France have 
been impacted in very different ways by EU legislation.  The chart below 
summarizes the TUC and CGT’s calculation of benefits deriving from EU 
social policies. 
 
Figure 3: Calculating the Benefits of European Integration for the TUC and CGT 
  benefits for unions? 
  Britain  France 
Health & Safety 
•  Single European Act (SEA), Art. 118a 
•  Framework Directive (1989) 
NO  NO 
Worker Participation & Representation 
•  European Works Council Directive (1995) 
YES  NO 
Employment Rights 
•  Collective Redundancies Directive (1975) 
•  Transfer of Undertakings Directive (1977) 
YES  NO 
Working Conditions 
•  Pregnant Workers Directive (1992) 
•  Working Time Directive (1993) 
•  Parental Leave Directive (1996) 
•  Atypical Workers Directive (1997) 
•  Framework Agreement on Rights for 
Workers on Fixed-Term Contracts (1999) 
YES  NO 
 
 
As  the  chart  illustrates,  the  benefits  of  European  social  policy 
developments have been more significant for the TUC than they have for 
the CGT, and I argue that the costs – both real and potential – of market 
integration  also  accrue  differently  to  the  two  confederations.    In  the 
following discussion I will present two such examples: monetary union and 
service liberalization.  In particular, the effects of EMU and the potential 
effects of the proposed “Bolkestein Directive” (Directive on Services in the 
Internal Market) have received a great deal of recent attention from the 
trade unions. 
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EMU 
Three aspects related to the introduction of the Euro have had implications 
for the trade unions.  First, the convergence criteria required member state 
governments  to  meet  restrictive  guidelines  for  exchange  rate  flexibility, 
interest  rates,  levels  of  budget  deficit,  inflation  rates  and  debt-to-GDP 
ratio.  As a result, many governments were forced to introduce austerity 
packages  reducing  government  spending.    Second,  the  Stability  and 
Growth Pact (SGP), adopted in 1997 under strong German pressure, was 
intended  to  enforce  budgetary  discipline  by  imposing  sanctions  on 
Eurozone  states  which  violate  debt  and  deficit  restrictions.    Third,  the 
common currency places control over monetary policy into the hands of 
the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB),  an  institution  which  is  much  more 
insulated from political pressures than many national central banks, and 
which  values  price  stability  (low  inflation)  above  all  else,  including  – 
worryingly  for  the  trade  unions  –  employment.    Since  EMU  deprives 
governments  within  the  Eurozone  of  control  over  exchange  rates  and 
interest  rates  as  a  means  of  adjusting  to  imbalances  in  economic 
performance, wage policy becomes increasingly important as a tool for 
compensating for such imbalances.
37 
 
The French decision to join the Eurozone thus brought with it important 
checks  on  government  autonomy  and  the  CGT  shared  the  general 
concerns of the trade unions across the Eurozone about the effect of the 
SGP on public spending and public services.  Given the extensive nature 
of  the  public  sector  in  France,  general  concerns  about  EMU  tying  the 
hands of national governments when it comes to domestic spending are 
all the more socially and politically relevant.  In France in the late 1990s, 
the convergence criteria became the popular scapegoat for any and all so-
called austerity measures.
38  In 1995, wage freezes in the public sector 
along with proposed social security and pension reforms led to massive 
strikes.  The CGT was not the only French trade union confederation to 
blame not just the Juppé government, but also the EU for the unpopular 
measures. 
 
Across the Channel, the UK opted out of the common currency when it 
was  introduced  (virtually)  in  1999,  but  the  exchange  rate  flexibility  the 
country  enjoys  is  seen  by  at  least  some  parts  of  the  TUC  as  a  poor 
substitute for the potential benefits of joining.  While sharing the general 
criticism of most unions for the restrictive convergence criteria and political 
unaccountability of the ECB, former TUC General Secretary John Monks 
argued in 1999 that “…the euro is now a reality ... The UK must not go on 
outside  the  European  mainstream.  It  will  be  bad  for  jobs,  bad  for 
investment and bad for our prosperity if we stay outside.”
 39  The TUC also 
                                                  
37   EIRO. “Wage Policy and EMU”, July 28, 2000. 
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on the requirements of EU policies in an attempt to shift the blame elsewhere. 
39   EIRO. “UK Trade Unions and the Euro”, May 28, 1999.   16 
holds that embracing the Euro would further strengthen the influence of 
the ‘European social model’ on British industrial relations.
40 
 
Among  the  TUC’s  affiliated  unions  there  are  mixed  feelings  about  the 
desirability of joining the Eurozone, but the official position of the TUC is 
support for joining.  The public sector unions, in particular, are skeptical 
about the fiscal requirements and lack of accountability of the European 
Central Bank, but their influence is balanced by a bloc of unions which 
strongly advocate Britain’s joining.  In any case, whatever the individual 
unions’  positions  on  the  Euro,  the  fact  remains  that  the  legacy  of 
Thatcher’s strict monetarism, which has not been significantly relaxed by 
the Labour government since taking office in 1997, means that the TUC 
puts the blame for tight fiscal policies squarely on the shoulders of the 
British government, rather than blaming the ECB, and by extension the EU 
more generally.  
 
EU Services 
Apart from EMU, I will provide just one other example – although there are 
certainly many – of how policies connected to the internal market bear 
differently  upon  the  trade  unions.    In  January  2004  the  European 
Commission proposed a draft directive on Services in the Internal Market 
(also called the EU Services Directive or, more commonly, the Bolkestein 
Directive after the Dutch Commissioner who proposed it).  The stated aim 
of the proposed directive is to create a true internal market in services, as 
envisioned  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  by  requiring  EU  member  states  to 
remove the barriers that currently prevent businesses from offering their 
services  across  borders  or  opening  branches  in  other  member  states.  
Member states would be required to remove ‘unnecessary barriers’ (such 
as  complex,  lengthy  and  costly  authorization  and  licensing  procedures) 
that  prevent  or  discourage  operators  from  other  member  states  from 
setting up on their territory.  Most contentiously for the trade unions, the 
proposed directive would introduce the ‘country of origin’ principle to the 
service sector, meaning that once a service provider is operating legally in 
one member state, it can market its services in other states without having 
to  comply  with  further  rules  in  these  ‘host’  member  states.    Service 
providers  would  no  longer  be  subject  to  numerous  divergent  national 
regulations,  administrative  requirements  and  duplication  of  supervisory 
controls. Essentially, the Bolkestein Directive would permit multinational 
companies to apply the social regulations of their home country when they 
do business elsewhere in the EU. 
 
The UK and France would stand to fare very differently if the directive is 
passed.
41    Britain,  substantially  deregulated  under  the  Conservative 
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governments that led the country during the 1980s and most of the 1990s, 
has many fewer public services than France, a country with one of the 
largest public sectors in Europe.  As a result, the UK would be subject to 
less  downward  pressure  than  would  France.   While  the TUC  does  not 
support the directive, its opposition to it is nowhere near as vehement as 
the CGT’s. 
 
The  French  unions,  like  those  from  Belgium  and  Germany,  have  been 
especially vociferous in their denunciation of the proposed directive.  The 
unions fear that companies based in highly-regulated states will relocate 
their  headquarters  to  low-regulation  states  in  order  to  apply  those 
standards  in  their  dealings  in  other  member  states,  thus  creating 
pressures for states to minimize social regulations in order to retain or 
attract companies.  Furthermore, they claim that states’ capacity to protect 
employees,  manage  public  resources,  guarantee  universal  access  to 
services, and ensure the quality of services will be sacrificed to market 
imperatives if the directive were passed in its original form.  In particular, 
they  are  concerned  that  ‘services  of  general  interest’  like  healthcare, 
education and culture will become overly marketized and public service 
sectors  will  be  privatized.    In  short,  they  fear  that  the  quality  of  public 
services  will  diminish  if  the  directive  succeeds  in  removing  as  many 
regulations as possible.  The unions worry, too, that the ‘country of origin’ 
principle creates legal incentives for companies to move to countries with 
the least strict legislation on social, fiscal and environmental issues, and 
create ‘letterbox companies’ offering low-cost services that operate from 
their registered offices across the whole territory of the EU.  Unions expect 
that  such  developments  will  put  enormous  pressure  on  countries  with 
social, fiscal and environmental standards that protect the public interest.
42 
 
The table below summarizes the perceived costs of monetary union and 
service liberalization within the TUC and the CCT. 
 
Figure 4: Calculating the Costs of European Integration for the TUC and CGT 
  costs for unions? 
  Britain  France 
EMU 
•  Convergence Criteria 
•  Stability & Growth Pact 
Low/Disputed  HIGH 
EU Services Directive 
(Bolkestein Directive)  Low/Disputed  HIGH 
                                                                                                                                   
of the EP) which drew some 50,000 trade union representatives.  In November 2006, a 
majority within the EP approved a compromise proposal which took into account the main 
trade union objectives to the draft directive.  In particular, the new proposal exempts labor law 
and ‘services of general interest’ (for example, healthcare provision) from the provisions of the 
directive and abolished the ‘country of origin’ provision.  The proposed directive due for a 
Council vote in 2007. 
42   These critiques have largely been addressed in the EP compromise proposal, but the 
Commission and Council are not bound to accept the revisions.   18 
Calculating Interests and Explaining European Orientations 
As should be clear by now, the impact of European integration on British 
and French workers has been quite different.  In turn, the ways that the 
TUC and the CGT understand their interests with respect to the EU are 
also  different.    This  leads  the  two  unions  to  pursue  different  sets  of 
objectives at the European level.  Assessing these objectives as a whole, I 
refer to the general European ‘orientation’ of the trade unions.  Because 
they  calculate  the  costs  and  benefits  of  EU  policies  differently,  the 
European orientation that each of the two unions has adopted is strikingly 
different,  even  though,  on  the  face  of  it,  both  unions  devised  their 
European  strategies  in  response  to  the  same  set  of  European 
developments.   
 
Where British workers have gained new rights as a result of European 
directives, French workers generally have not.  Furthermore, the domestic 
effects  of  EMU  have  been  a  source  of  considerable  contention  for  the 
French trade unions.  EMU, and the EU by extension, is seen as posing a 
real  challenge  to  the  French  social  model.    The  Bolkestein  Directive, 
likewise, is seen as a way of undermining the restrictions and regulations 
that  states  place  on  the  businesses  that  operate  within  their  borders.  
Deregulation in Britain over the past two decades means that the impact 
of  this  directive  would  be  altogether  different  than  in  France,  which 
maintains many more restrictions and regulations on business practices.  
These differences in the impact of European-level developments on the 
two countries mean that the CGT calculates the costs of the directive to be 
much higher than the TUC does. 
 
Institutional  variation  between  British  and  French  systems  of  labor 
regulation and social service provisions account for the different ways that 
the  TUC  and  the  CGT  assess  their  interests  with  regard  to  the  EU.  
Differing  national  systems  of  labor  regulation  mean  that  the  perceived 
benefits of EU social policy are much more significant for British workers 
than for the French.  At the same time, the costs of monetary union and 
service liberalization are perceived as higher in France than in Britain as a 
result of institutional variation at the national level. 
 
The  TUC’s  constructive  European  orientation  and  the  CGT’s  defensive 
European orientation are  the  result  of  the way  that  each  confederation 
weighs the overall impact of European integration.  The TUC is willing to 
see Brussels take greater policy-making initiative because it is more likely 
to get favorable policies out of the EU than from its own government, and 
– as the TUC often bemoans – this remains true even since Blair’s Labour 
government came to power.  The CGT, on the other hand, sees potential 
threats for the generous French social system if too much policy authority 
is concentrated in Brussels.  The two unions thus pursue very different 
objectives in the EU, based on their calculations of how well integration   19 
serves  their  interests.    The  TUC  supports  the  centralization  of  certain 
political powers at the European level while the CGT seeks to shield at 
least certain areas of national politics from EU influence.   
 
Generalizing from the British and French Cases 
I have argued that, in Britain, the higher benefits and uncertain or diffuse 
costs of integration differ significantly from the relatively lower benefits and 
higher  costs  for  France.    Based  on  these  two  cases,  I  generalize  that 
unions  in  countries  where  social  provisions  and  labor  regulations  are 
strong  and  entrenched  are  less  likely  to  perceive  tangible  gains  from 
European-level  social  harmonization  and  are  more  likely  to  perceive 
incipient EU provisions as a challenge to their existing domestic practices.  
I expect trade union confederations from such countries to tend towards 
defensive  European  orientations.    On  the  other  hand,  for  unions  in 
countries  where  social  provisions  and  worker  protections  are  under-
developed  or  regressing,  the  prospect  of  European-level  harmonization 
often  holds  the  promise  of  real  gains  for  workers.    Trade  union 
confederations from these countries are more likely to hold constructive 
European orientations. 
 
Generalizing  from  the  cases  of  the  TUC  and  the  CGT,  I  expect  trade 
unions  to  hold  a  constructive  orientation  towards  the  EU  when  they 
perceive that there are sufficient potential material benefits from doing so 
to outweigh the costs of strategic innovation and institutional inertia.  As a 
corollary,  I  hold  that  unions  with  a  low  capacity  for  achieving  their 
objectives domestically or unions from countries with only modest levels of 
domestic social provision are most likely to hold constructive orientations 
towards  Europe.    On  the  other  hand,  unions  with  a  high  capacity  for 
achieving their interests within the domestic framework and unions from 
countries  with  very  high  levels  of  domestic  social  provision  should  be 
expected to hold a defensive orientation towards the EU.  
 
Evidence from both the Italian CGIL and the German DGB supports this 
hypothesis.    Germany,  like  France,  has  an  expansive  system  of  labor 
protection and social regulation and the DGB, like the CGT, has taken a 
defensive orientation towards the EU.  As one scholar has written, DGB 
officials, “rarely miss an opportunity to embrace Europe rhetorically,” but 
the  Confederation’s  activities  in  Brussels  have  mostly  been  aimed  at 
protecting  the  German  industrial  relations  model  rather  than  advancing 
any particularly European program.
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Italy,  like  the  UK,  falls  far  short  of  the  high  levels  of  social  services 
provided  in  France  and  Germany.    Italy  never  developed  labor  market 
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protections  as  strong  as  its  northern  neighbors,  and  the  UK  has  seen 
worker  protections  and  social  benefits  significantly  rolled  back  since 
Thatcher  came  to  power  in  1979.    Even  the  modest  EU  social  policy 
advances  of  the  1990s  implied  tangible  benefits  for  Italian  and  British 
workers  and  the  CGIL,  like  the  TUC,  has  adopted  a  constructive 
orientation towards the EU.  In fact, the CGIL vision of Europe is far more 
federal than any of the other unions in this study.
44 
 
IV. Trade Union Tactics  
We have seen that unions differ with regard to the European objectives 
they pursue, with some seeking to build up a body of European legislation 
while others focus more on defending national systems.  In this section we 
will see that unions also differ in terms of the means they use to pursue 
their European goals.  
 
Institutionalized versus Activist Tactics  
In this paper the term tactics is used to refer to the repertoire of action that 
a union pursues to advance its European goals – it refers to the different 
ways that unions use the European arena.  I conceptualize these different 
forms  of  influence  as  two  ideal  types,  which  I  call  institutionalized  and 
activist.  Those unions which seek influence by forging relationships with 
the  European  political  institutions  in  order  to  exert  pressure  over  the 
policy-making process can be said pursue institutionalized tactics.  These 
unions tend to approach the EU as interest groups.  On the other hand, 
those unions which focus more on periodic mobilization – for example, in 
European demonstrations – can be said to rely on more activist tactics.  In 
general, they tend to approach the EU more as protest movements than 
as interest groups. 
 
The TUC 
The TUC relies on institutionalized tactics to pursue its goals within the 
context of the EU.  The union pushes its agenda through a Brussels office, 
opened in 1993, which liaises with Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs)  and  the  Commission,  as  well  as  the  Economic  and  Social 
Committee (EcoSoc) and even sympathetic (that is, generally, non-British) 
members of the Council.  The TUC’s Brussels office fulfills a dual function 
of gathering information and representing the TUC’s interests.  The TUC 
representatives in Brussels are charged with gaining familiarity with the 
European  institutions,  key  actors,  legislation  in  progress  and  the 
ramifications  of  proposed  policies  for  the  trade  union  movement 
domestically.    At  the  same  time,  the  TUC  viewed  opening  an  office  in 
Brussels as a way to strengthen its presence in this concentrated policy 
environment.
45  To understand how the TUC pursues its interests at the 
                                                  
44   Barnouin, Barbara. The European Labour Movement and European Integration. London: 
Frances Pinter, 1986. 
45   TUC. “Report of 125th Annual Trades Union Congress.” Brighton, 6-10 September 1993: 245.   21 
European level, it is first necessary to take a quick detour through the EU 
policy process. Following this discussion, we will look at a representative 
case – the revision of the Working Time Directive – to get a more concrete 
sense  of  how  the  TUC  interacts  with  the  EU  institutions  to  pursue  its 
European objectives. 
 
Because  of  the  many  institutional  actors  involved  in  EU  policy-making, 
there  are  many  points  at  which  interest  groups  can  attempt  to  exert 
influence over EU policies.  Since the Commission initiates all proposals, 
most interest groups – and the TUC is no exception – seek to focus much 
of  their  lobbying  effort  there,  primarily  by  targeting  the  appropriate 
Directorate-General (DG).
46  The TUC has traditionally worked hardest to 
cultivate relations within DG V (Social Affairs).
47 
 
However, the EP’s increasingly important role in colegislating alongside 
the Council makes it an important secondary arena for exerting influence.  
As a result of the extension of co-determination in EU policy-making since 
Amsterdam, the EP has gained in stature and organized interests have 
therefore begun to place greater emphasis on influencing the EP.
48  The 
EP also holds particular attraction for the TUC, since several of its larger 
affiliates sponsor individual members of the European Parliament (MEPs).  
This  gives  the  TUC,  as  those  unions’  Brussels-based  representative, 
privileged access to individuals and to the caucus of Labour Party MEPs.  
Furthermore, the trade union intergroup, a semi-formal caucus of labor-
friendly MEPs, provides a point of access for the TUC within the EP. 
 
Finally, because the Council must ultimately approve any policy proposals 
before they become legislation, interest groups also seek support in the 
Council for their positions.  For unions with close relationships with their 
own governments, this influence is largely exerted at the national level, 
within traditional domestic political frameworks.  However, for a union like 
the  TUC,  which  is  not  particularly  well  integrated  into  domestic  policy-
making,  and  thus  has  little  influence  over  the  positions  of  its  own 
government, the Council becomes an important arena for networking with 
other  member  state  governments  whose  positions  are  more  closely 
aligned with those of the TUC on specific issue areas.
49  However, at this 
late stage in the decision-making procedure, exerting influence tends to be 
much more difficult since the issues are already defined and framed, and 
positions  tend  to  be  much  more  entrenched  than  earlier  in  the  policy 
process.
50 
                                                  
46   Greenwood, Justin. Interest Representation in the European Union. New York: Palgrave 
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47   Interviews: TUC officer February 2004; TUC European officer, July 2004. 
48   Sometimes this entails targeting specific MEPs and other times unions try to exert influence 
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49   Interviews, TUC, London and Brussels, 2004. 
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The TUC’s primary tactic for pursuing its interests at the European level is 
to lobby the political institutions of the EU in an attempt to build a coalition 
around the position it has staked out on pending legislation.
51  This tactic 
requires  not  only  tremendous  expertise  on  European  affairs  (to 
understand the intricacies of the EU’s various policy-making processes, as 
well  as  know  what  legislation  is  in  the  pipes  before  a  White  Paper  or 
Commission report is issued, since that is when policy is most open to 
influence) but also an extensive network of contacts within the various EU 
political  institutions.    This  would  be  nearly  impossible  to  conceive  of 
without a local administrative and lobbying organization, and the TUC’s 
experience lobbying Whitehall has provided a useful template for pursuing 
its interests within Brussels. 
 
The Working Time Directive and its Revision 
The  TUC’s  attempts  to  influence  the  revisions  of  the  Working  Time 
Directive  in  2003-04  provide  a  concrete  example  of  the  ways  that  the 
union works with the political institutions of the EU – particularly, in this 
case, with the EP and the Commission. 
 
European legislation on working conditions expanded over the 1980s and 
1990s after the SEA removed the national veto each country held in the 
Council by introducing QMV in certain policy areas, including “the working 
environment”  and  “working  conditions”.
52    The  Delors  Commission 
interpreted these terms expansively and pushed forward with legislation in 
these areas via the 1989 Social Action Program and the Social Charter.  
One example is the 1993 Working Time Directive.
53  Using the SEA as its 
treaty  basis,  the  directive  was  couched  in  terms  of  worker  health  and 
safety and thus subject to Art. 118a of the SEA and, significantly, to QMV 
rather than unanimity voting procedures. 
 
The  Working  Time  Directive  limits  the  average  workweek  to  forty-eight 
hours  for  most  workers,
54  imposes  rest  periods  between  and  within 
workdays and grants four weeks’ paid leave per year.  It recommends, but 
does not mandate, further restrictions on nightwork.  In 2000, the directive 
was extended to previously excluded sectors and activities.
55 
                                                  
51   This process was explained to me in a series of interviews with the current and past heads at 
the TUC’s office in Brussels, and is in accordance with information given to me in interviews 
with the TUC’s European officers in London. 
52   The key articles in the SEA were Art. 110a, which established QMV in the Council for the 
‘approximation’ of laws relating to the creation of the internal market, and 118a, which 
extended QMV to areas related to the ‘working environment, as regards the health and safety 
of workers’ and called for an improvement in working conditions.  (Geyer, 2000: 86) 
53   The original Directive, 93/104/EC was consolidated as 2003/88/EC. 
54   The Directive provides for derogations for certain types of workers (most significantly, transport 
workers, sea workers and doctors) and in cases where collective agreements have been 
reached between employers and the affected workers. 
55   The extension was the subject of much contention among the EU institutions.  Usage of the 
co-decision procedure to extend the Directive meant that both the Council and Parliament   23 
 
The TUC strongly supported the directive but was unable to overcome the 
opposition  of  the  British  government.    In  an  attempt  to  mitigate  British 
opposition, the UK was granted an individual opt-out clause: in essence, 
British workers were permitted to sign away their right to be covered by 
the directive.  Such concessions notwithstanding, when the directive was 
voted on in the Council of Ministers in November 1993, the UK abstained 
and, challenging the legal basis of the directive, refused to implement it.
56  
The  ECJ  ruled  against  Britain  in  1996,
57  leaving  the  incoming  Blair 
government  with  the  responsibility  of  bringing  Britain  into  compliance.  
When it did, it preserved the individual opt-out over the strong objections 
of the TUC. 
 
In 2004, the Commission launched a consultation procedure in advance of 
revising the directive.  One of the articles up for revision was the British 
opt-out, something the TUC in particular was eager to do away with.  The 
TUC  used  all  its  ties  with  the  EU  institutions  to  advance  its  position.  
Within  the  Commission,  the  TUC  pressed  its  view  within  DG-V  (Social 
Affairs) generally and with Anna Diamantopoulou, the Commissioner for 
Social Affairs, in particular.
58  The TUC presented a dossier to the EU 
Social  Affairs  Commissioner  calling  for  a  strengthening  of  the  directive 
which would end the UK opt-out, prevent British employers from counting 
bank holidays as a part of the four weeks of paid holiday guaranteed by 
the directive, and enforce violations of the directive more vigorously.
59  It 
also  worked  with  the  EP’s  Trade  Union  Intergroup  (then  headed  by  a 
British MEP, Stephen Hughes, who has close ties with one of the TUC’s 
most important affiliates, the GMB).  At monthly Trade Union Intergroup 
meetings, the head of the TUC’s Brussels office pushed the EP to amend 
the directive to end the opt-out.  The TUC also pushed its affiliates with 
MEP sponsorships to move the amendment higher on their agendas.
60 
 
                                                                                                                                   
were to co-legislate.  But failing to agree on a common policy, the institutions had to create a 
conciliation committee (per Art. 251) to negotiate a compromise text. 
56   The government claimed that, since Britain had opted-out of the Social Chapter appended to 
the Maastricht Treaty, it was thus not responsible for implementing the social legislation 
agreed to by the other member states.  However, the Working Time Directive had been 
introduced by the Commission as a health and safety measure rather than by means of the 
Social Protocol.  The Directive was thus subject to QMV and binding on all EU member states. 
57   UK v Council of the European Union Case C-84/94 [1996] ECR I-5755. 
58   Along with Delors, Diamantopoulou was instrumental in pressing the TUC to drop its 
opposition to European integration in the late 1980s.  On multiple occasions she addressed the 
TUC or its member unions, and the TUC developed a particularly close relationship with her as 
a resultand.  The TUC’s relationship with Diamantopoulou was mentioned to me in interviews 
in 2004 in both the TUC’s Brussels office and at its London headquarters.   
59   “TUC welcomes working time review”, TUC Press Release, January 5, 2004. 
60   This point was made in an interview at the Brussels office of the GMB, one of the TUC’s 
largest affiliates (2004).  The respondent underscored that the TUC and the GMB have a 
complementary rather than a competitive relationship in Brussels because there is a clear 
division of labor: since the TUC has no authority to sponsor parliamentarians, the task of 
maintaining such relationships clearly falls to the affiliates that do.   24 
In  the  end,  the  EP  backed  the  TUC  position.    The  Parliament’s 
amendment  of  the  directive  called  for  an  end  to  the  opt-out  clause  by 
2010,
61  although  the  amended  directive  must  be  passed  by  both  the 
Commission and the Council of Ministers before being implemented.  The 
TUC has recently shifted attention back to the Commission and, as the 
vote approaches in the Council, the TUC will network with representatives 
of the other member states – many of whom resent the British opt-out – to 
assemble a majority in favor of amending the directive. 
 
The CGT 
The TUC’s emphasis in advancing its European objectives is on working 
closely with the various EU political institutions; the CGT has taken a very 
different – and less institutionalized – tactic in pursuit of its interests at the 
European level.  It has neither an office in Brussels, nor any permanent 
contact with the political institutions of the EU.  It joined the ETUC in 1999, 
and since 2003 is represented in the ETUC’s Secretariat.  But apart from 
participation in ETUC activities, the CGT does not interact regularly with 
the  European  institutions,  and  has  no  permanent  representative  in 
Brussels.  Expertise in European affairs is limited to a few members of the 
international department.  Instead of working within the halls of political 
power  in  Brussels and  Strasbourg,  the  CGT has pursued  its  European 
agenda  since  the  mid-1990s  by  mobilizing  its  rank-and-file  for 
demonstrations  organized  at  the  European  level,  or  nationally  around 
European themes.   
 
The Euro-strike 
In one such example, the CGT mobilized demonstrations and sympathy 
strikes with Belgian workers laid off by Renault.  This was not merely a 
case of international solidarity, but a particularly European one, as one of 
the main issues of union contention
62 was the charge that the company 
did  not  follow  the  requirements  of  EU  legislation  on  collective 
redundancies  and  worker  consultation,
63  and  it  did  not  adequately 
recognize the rights of the European Works Council at the plant.
64 
                                                  
61   Article 22, paragraph 3a. 
62   Along with the unions, the EU Commission and the EP also condemned Renault’s “Anglo-
Saxon” restructuring and initiated an inquiry into its legality in light of EU legislation. Imig, 
Douglas R., and Sidney G. Tarrow. “From Strike to Eurostrike: The Europeanization of Social 
Movements and the Development of a Euro-Polity.” WCFIA Working Paper 97, no. 1 (1997). 
63   The Directive on Collective Redundancies requires the prior consultation of workforce 
representatives when mass redundancies are planned. In the Vilvoorde case, Renault, in fact, 
followed the letter of the law, if not its spirit, by informing the plant’s workforce representatives 
a few minutes before announcing the closure in a press conference. 
64   Again, Renault met the specific and narrow requirements of the legislation.  The EWC 
Directive requires the information and consultation of workforce representatives in the event of 
major restructuring, but also contains a loophole.  Companies which established works 
councils through voluntary agreements prior to the EWC Directive’s September 1996 deadline 
were not compelled to renegotiate them in order to come into compliance with the terms of the 
Directive. 
Renault, which had established a “European Group Committee” in 1993, was thus bound 
only by the less stringent terms of its own plant-level agreement, and not by the terms of the   25 
 
In  February  1997  Renault  announced  the  closure  –  by  July  –  of  its 
production plant in Vilvoorde, Belgium, at a cost of some 3,000 Renault 
jobs  plus  an  estimated  1,500  additional  employees  in  direct  supply 
companies.
65    The  decision,  announced  without  advance  notice  or 
consultation with unions, workforce representatives, or government, drew 
an  immediate  outcry  from  employees.    Following  the  announcement, 
employees  occupied  the  plant  and  gathered  for  a  spontaneous  march 
against the decision.
66  Workers and workers’ groups across Europe were 
outraged by a decision which they claimed contravened both procedural 
norms as well as EU and national legislation concerning factory closures, 
collective  redundancies  and  works  council  rights  which  stipulate  that 
employees have to be notified before a decision about a factory closure is 
made and informed about the ways in which the company plans to deal 
with the consequences for the employees. 
 
The  decision  prompted  an  unusual  show  of  transnational  European 
solidarity, with French and Spanish Renault employees organizing work 
stoppages and demonstrations.  Union actions took two forms – what Imig 
and  Tarrow  called,  “‘guerrilla  actions’  involving  a  small  number  of 
participants  intended  for  maximum  media  impact,  and  mass 
demonstrations designed to show the workers’ power in numbers.”
67  On 
March 7 the CGT called a one-hour strike in all French Renault plants in 
response to the Vilvoorde closing and also mobilized a substantial portion 
of  the  5000
68  French  participants  at  a  10,000-strong  demonstration  on 
March  11  at  Renault’s  headquarters  in  Billancourt,  outside  of  Paris.
69  
                                                                                                                                   
EWC Directive.  The 1993 agreement between Renault and its Vilvoorde workers was that the 
European Group Committee would meet “at least once a year by order of the chair”, who is 
also the president of Renault.  Despite the unions’ insistence that, under the terms of the EWC 
Directive, the Committee had the right to be consulted before any major plant restructuring, the 
company management had no legal requirement to order an extraordinary meeting of the 
Committee prior to the closure of the Vilvoorde plant.  
Nevertheless, both Belgian and French courts ruled against Renault’s actions.  In April a 
Brussels industrial tribunal decided that Renault had breached rules on worker information and 
consultation.  Similarly, a French court in Nanterre, ruled that the company had failed in its 
duty to inform employees of the impending closure, as required since the decision concerned 
“Renault’s strategic orientation and was a major change in a European Subsidiary that would 
have repercussions at European level”.  (EIRO, “EU continues to feel impact of Renault crisis” 
April 29, 1997.  See also EIRO, “The Renault-Vilvorde affair: ‘Euro-strike’ against the closure 
of its Belgian plant”, March 28, 1997.  
65   EIRO, “The closure of Renault-Vilvoorde”, March 28, 1997. 
66   EIRO, “Renault closes assembly plant in Vilvoorde without prior notice”, February 28, 1997.   
67   Imig, Douglas R., and Sidney G. Tarrow. “From Strike to Eurostrike: The Europeanization of 
Social Movements and the Development of a Euro-Polity.” WCFIA Working Paper 97, no. 1 
(1997). 
68   Imig, Douglas R., and Sidney G. Tarrow. “From Strike to Eurostrike: The Europeanization of 
Social Movements and the Development of a Euro-Polity.” WCFIA Working Paper 97, no. 1 
(1997).  Personal communication from European officer of the CGT, June 2004. 
69   The strike on March 7 was not limited to the CGT, but also included workers at French, 
Belgian, Spanish, Portuguese and Slovenian Renault plants and involved more than half of its 
workforce Imig, Douglas R., and Sidney G. Tarrow. “From Strike to Eurostrike: The   26 
Later  in  the  month,  the  CGT  sent a  delegation  constituting  upwards  of 
twenty  percent  of  a  demonstration  of  between  75,000  and  100,000 
workers in Brussels.  Carrying banners with slogans that included “This 
Europe - no thanks” and “Europe without frontiers: yes; Europe without 
jobs:  no”,
70  demonstrators  clearly  saw  the  Renault  fiasco  as  part  of  a 
larger issue of EU politics.  Yet the CGT, at least, made no move to work 
within  institutionalized  policy  channels  to  affect  the  Renault  closing;  it 
relied entirely on protest and mass mobilization to pursue its goals.  
 
Journées d’action 
In  another  form  of  activist-based  influence,  the  CGT  also  mobilizes  at 
much higher levels than the TUC for European Days of Action.  These 
events,  generally  organized  by  the  ETUC  in  order  to  raise  awareness 
about and promote European social and labor issues, have taken place 
with  increasingly  frequency  since  the  mid-1990s.    In  some  cases,  the 
ETUC merely sets the date and theme (e.g. employment, “social Europe”) 
and leaves each affiliate to choose its own activity in support of the day of 
action.    On  other  occasions,  the  ETUC  will  organize  a  march  or 
demonstration and request that affiliates mobilize member participation in 
a given location. 
 
In these days of action, the CGT tends to mobilize numbers far higher 
than the European average, and certainly much higher than the TUC.  Of 
some  75,000-100,000  demonstrators  in  the  Brussels  protest  that 
coincided with the Vilvoorde affair, around 20,000 of them marched under 
the CGT banner.  The Spanish unions, which were also directly affected 
by  the  Renault  restructuring,  sent  only  sixty  workers.
71    At  the  day  of 
action protest in Laeken (near Brussels) in 2001, the TUC was virtually 
absent while the CGT was represented by a delegation of 15,000.
72  At a 
March 2005 protest against the Bolkestein Directive the CGT mobilized 
15,000 of the total 51-65,000 trade union marchers.
73  (For comparison, 
the  TUC,  which  has  ten  times  as  many  members  as  the  CGT,  was 
represented by no more than 200 members!)   
 
                                                                                                                                   
Europeanization of Social Movements and the Development of a Euro-Polity.” WCFIA Working 
Paper 97, no. 1 (1997). 
70   EIRO, “EU continues to feel impact of Renault crisis” April 29, 1997. 
71   Imig, Douglas R., and Sidney G. Tarrow. “From Strike to Eurostrike: The Europeanization of 
Social Movements and the Development of a Euro-Polity.” WCFIA Working Paper 97, no. 1 
(1997). 
 
72    “Sommet de Laeken: une mobilisation syndicale inégalée!” CGT press release, December 18, 
2001. 
73   Figures are from an ETUC internal document projecting participation figures in the “More and 
Better Jobs” demonstration.   27 
Indeed, the CGT has summed up its own position concisely: “In the search 
for a more effective form of European-level trade union action, the visibility 
of the ETUC’s actions, and that of its affiliates, is a critical factor.”
74 
 
Weighing Alternate Explanations for Union Tactics 
Are these differences in the TUC’s and CGT’s choice of tactics within the 
EU a product of their specific policy objectives, or does something else 
explain why the two unions use such different methods to pursue their 
interests at the European level?  In principle, it is possible that the form of 
engagement each union decides upon is chosen because it is the best 
suited  to  the  particular  objectives  that  each  union  has  set  for  itself.  
Looking beyond the TUC and CGT, however, it becomes apparent that the 
form of European engagement the unions pursue is determined, not by 
their objectives, but by institutional legacies from the unions’ decades of 
experience  pursuing  their  interests  at  the  domestic  level.    The  unions 
have,  in  essence,  re-established  at  the  European  level,  forms  of 
engagement  developed  to  pursue  the  unions’  interests  at  the  national 
level.  Consequently, the TUC pursues its interests at the European level 
as an interest group while the CGT acts more like a protest movement. 
   
The shadow cases of the DGB and CGIL lend support for the hypothesis 
that  institutional  legacies  rather  than  European  objectives  structure  the 
means by which unions engage with the EU.  Whereas I argued in the 
previous section that the DGB, like the CGT, holds defensive European 
objectives, it is clear that the DGB and the CGT use very different tactics 
to pursue their goals at the European level.  In fact, the DGB pursues its 
interests within the EU in a way that is very similar to the way the TUC 
pursues  its  interests.    Despite  their  different  European  objectives,  both 
confederations have established permanent offices in Brussels that project 
their  positions  to  the  European  institutions  and  create  networks  of 
influence.  Why?  I hold that unions like the TUC and DGB, which rely on 
lobbying and negotiation to pursue their goals at the national level, re-
establish similar relationships at the European level.   
 
Similarly,  the  CGIL,  which,  like  the  TUC,  holds  constructive  European 
objectives, uses tactics to pursue its goals at the European level that more 
closely resembles the CGT’s.  Although the CGIL has opened an office in 
Brussels,  its  function  is  one  of  transmitting  information,  as  opposed  to 
exerting  influence.    In  an  interview  in  2004,  the  head  of  the  CGIL’s 
Brussels office told me, 
 
The original goal in setting up a CGIL office in Brussels was to transmit 
information about the EU back to Rome.  Now it’s the opposite and much 
                                                  
74   “La recherché d’une plus grande efficacité de l’action revendicative européene fait de la 
visibilité de l’action de la Ces [ETUC] et de celle de ses composantes un des facteurs 
determinants.”  CGT. “Le 10e congrès de la Confédération européenne des syndicats”, Le 
Peuple, June 25, 2003.   28 
greater emphasis is placed on relaying information, interests from Rome 
to Brussels.  Lobbying, however, is not in the culture of the Italian trade 
unions.  Even in Rome, the CGIL doesn’t do this.
75 
 
Unions like the CGT and CGIL, which have traditionally relied on mass 
mobilization for influence at the national level, pursue their goals at the 
European level using similarly activist means.  Neither has attempted to 
push  its  interests  through  the  institutionalized  channels  of  EU  interest 
representation.    On  the  other  hand,  despite  their  different  orientations, 
both  unions  are  consistently  disproportionately  over-represented  in  the 
demonstrations and marches to further European “Days of Action”.   
 
If unions’ orientations were the determining factor in how they engage at 
the  European  level,  we  should  expect  to  see  the  TUC  and  the  CGIL 
pursuing their goals in similar ways, and, on the other hand, the CGT and 
the DGB pursuing their goals in a similar fashion.  Instead we see that, 
instead of unions with similar objectives engaging at the European level in 
similar ways, it is unions with similar institutional legacies that use Europe 
in a similar fashion.  Unions’ calculation of their interests leads them to 
pursue specific types of objectives at the European level, but the unions’ 
institutional legacies rather than their European objectives, lead them to 
use the European arena in the specific ways that they do. 
 
Historical developments and institutional legacies 
There are a number of institutional similarities among the TUC and the 
DGB on the one hand, and the CGT and the CGIL on the other that lead 
them to pursue their interests – both national and European – in similar 
ways.    Despite  important  national  differences  among  the  unions,  the 
historical  development  of  the  TUC  and  the  DGB  have  led  them  to 
institutionalize repertoires of action based on political influence while the 
CGT  and  CGIL  have  developed  more  activist,  protest-based  forms  of 
influence.  The TUC and the DGB have traditionally behaved as organized 
interest groups within the national setting while the CGT and CGIL have 
acted  like  protest  movements.    These  domestic  legacies  have  largely 
determined  the  ways  that  each  union  has  pursued  its  interests  at  the 
European level. 
 
Trade Unions as Interest Groups: The TUC and DGB 
Britain  and  Germany  are  unique  in  Western  Europe  for  having  nearly 
unitary  trade  union  movements.   Whereas  in  Italy  and  France  multiple 
trade union organizations organize workers, in Germany and Britain one 
confederation  represents  nearly  the  entire  trade  union  movement.
76    In 
                                                  
75   Interview in the CGIL’s Brussels office, March 2004. 
76   Of Britain’s astonishing 226 trade unions, 74 of them affiliate to the TUC, representing over 
80% of the total trade union membership.  In Germany, the 16 sectorally-based unions that 
affiliate to the DGB likewise comprise just under 80% of all trade unionists. Data are from 
Ebbinghaus, Bernhard, and Jelle Visser. Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945. CD-
ROM. London: Macmillan Reference Ltd., 2000.   29 
neither case, though, does the TUC or the DGB constitute a monolithic 
bloc with a monopoly on coordinating national union activities.  In both 
cases, affiliated unions retain significant autonomy to negotiate, bargain 
and strike.
77  Partly because their affiliates retain control over the strike – 
and thus over industrial affairs more generally – both the TUC and the 
DGB rely on institutionalized political channels to represent labor interests.  
In  the  case  of  the  TUC,  this  takes  the  form  of  organized  interest 
representation while in the case of the DGB it more often takes the form of 
social partnership. 
 
Until the 1980s, the primary sources of the TUC’s power stemmed from its 
role  in  adjudicating  disputes  among  affiliated  unions  and,  more 
importantly, its position as conduit to the government, through its position 
in  tripartite  bargaining  and  on  consultative  bodies.
78    In  the  1970s  and 
especially during the Labour government of 1974-1979 the TUC reached a 
peak  of  influence  through  its  involvement  in  setting  pay  policy  and 
participation in a broad range of quasi-governmental economic planning, 
industrial, training, educational, community and health bodies, which gave 
a tremendous influence over domestic policies. 
 
It is much the same story in Germany.  Because most of the day-to-day 
work  of  industrial  relations  is  divided  between  the  sectorally-based 
industrial unions which affiliate to the DGB (e.g. wage negotiations) and 
the firm-level works councils (e.g. worker consultation), the DGB itself has 
tended to focus on broader issues of economic management and social 
protection,  which  it pursues  through  social  partnership and  government 
lobbying.
79 
 
Trade Unions as Protest Groups: The CGT and CGIL 
The CGT and CGIL developed in an altogether different manner, and their 
tactics for exerting influence are radically different from those of the TUC 
and DGB.  Under both the French and Italian systems of labor relations, 
trade unions in general (not just the CGT and CGIL) are much weaker and 
less  institutionalized  than  in  Britain  and  Germany,  and  the  unions 
themselves much more combatative.  As one scholar has written, “The low 
level  of  institutionalized  collective  bargaining  in  France,  the  anti-labor 
hostility of French employers, and the ‘class’ orientations of French unions 
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made  French  industrial  relations  …  a  battlefield.”
80    In  many  ways  the 
same  is  true  of  Italy,  where  trade  unions  had  no  legal  protection 
whatsoever until the late 1950s and early 60s, and where existing (fascist) 
legal codes were commonly interpreted in favor of employers rather than 
workers.
81  Italy’s “economic miracle” in the post-war years came at a high 
price  for  workers:  organized  business  pursued  a  low-wage,  export-
oriented  growth  strategy  which  exploited  the  unions’  precarious  legal 
standing in order to avoid labor regulation.   
 
The inherent weakness of French and Italian unions was exacerbated in 
the cases of the Communist-oriented CGT and CGIL in particular.  Seen 
as “transmission belts”, or agents of their respective national Communist 
Parties, both the CGT and CGIL were ideologically isolated and political 
weak.
82    The  permanent  exclusion  of  both  the  French  and  Italian 
Communist  Parties  from  government  meant  that  the  CGT  and  CGIL 
lacked political influence and the other French and Italian unions’ attempts 
to ostracize their communist-oriented counterparts meant that concerted 
trade union cooperation was unlikely.   
 
The comparative strength of both the CGT and the CGIL was thus their 
membership.    Both  unions  have  been  the  dominant  trade  union 
organization in their respective national setting.  And although both have 
suffered  from  the  general  membership  decline  that  has  afflicted  nearly 
every trade union in Western Europe since the late 1970s, the position of 
the  CGT  and  CGIL  relative  to  their  national  counterparts  remained 
strong.
83  If the CGT and the CGIL did not have the luxury of a responsive 
government to advance their interests, they could at least use their sheer 
numbers  to  compel  concessions.    Furthermore,  mass  mobilization  was 
part and parcel of the unions’ Communist lineage.  Even after the CGIL’s 
Eurocommunist turn, as it sought cooperation with the CISL and UIL and 
celebrated long-overdue changes in the Italian labor code and industrial 
relations  system,  the  union’s  emphasis  on  mass  mobilization  never 
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diminished.
84  Even for the CGIL, political influence might supplement, but 
did not replace, the power of bringing people into the streets.  The brief 
inclusion of the PCF in government following Mitterrand’s election in 1981 
proved a grave disappointment for the CGT, solidifying the union’s resolve 
that  mobilization  rather  than  political  influence  was  the  best  means  for 
pursuing its interests. 
 
By  the  time the EU  began  to  seriously  enter  the  consciousness  of  the 
trade  unions,  each  had  institutionalized  its  own  means  of  exerting 
influence within the domestic arena.  As each of these four trade union 
organizations has turned its emphasis to the emerging European arena, it 
has drawn on its traditional repertoires of action to pursue the European 
goals it sets out for itself, even when those objectives are quite different.  
In particular, the TUC has drawn on its history as a conduit to government 
and established itself in Brussels as a hub of lobbying, networking and 
information flows between its affiliates and the political institutions of the 
EU,  while  the  CGT  has  drawn  on  its  main  mobilizing  device  from  the 
1960s and 70s, the journée d’action
85 – day-long strikes or demonstrations 
–  to  marshal  support  from  its  rank-and-file  around  European  days  of 
action. 
 
‘Europeanizing’ Old Repertoires 
Throughout  the  post-war  period,  the  TUC  and  DGB  have  exerted  their 
influence by working within institutionalized channels – lobbying, sitting on 
governmental  and  quasi-governmental  bodies,  participating  in  tripartite 
forums.  The CGT and CGIL have exerted their influence by mobilizing 
their memberships for demonstrations, rallies, marches and other highly 
visible public manifestations of strength.  These differences in the unions’ 
repertoires of action have essentially been replicated as the unions began 
to pursue their interests within the European arena.
86 
 
The nature of the four unions’ approaches to the EU can be illustrated by 
looking  at  the  different  ways  that  each  union  conceptualizes  European 
‘action’.  To give just one example, and one that is fairly typical, this is how 
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the four unions responded to the 1997 day of action around the theme 
“Europe Must Work”:  In Britain, the TUC organized a media campaign 
and  a  half-day  conference  at  its  national  headquarters  on  the  topic  of 
social  Europe.    In  France,  the  CGT  helped  to  organize  a  mass 
demonstration in Paris with about 80,000 participants.  In Germany, the 
DGB organized a conference on Europe and Employment in Frankfurt, the 
home of the ECB.  And in Italy, the CGIL staged a series of sit-ins and 
protests with the other Italian unions.
87   
 
The concept of European ‘action’ clearly means very different things to the 
different unions: the CGT and CGIL pursue more activist tactics than do 
the TUC and DGB.  During an interview, the head of the Swedish unions’ 
office in Brussels quipped that, “In response to a European day of action, 
the French and Italians will send a million people into the streets and the 
Swedes will organize a seminar.”
88  The German and British unions tend 
to  resemble  the  Swedes  in  that  regard.    I  argue  that  these  different 
understandings  of  trade  union  action  are  consistent  with  the  ways  of 
exerting  influence  that  each  union  has  institutionalized  at  the  domestic 
level. 
 
V. Conclusion 
In  the  1980s  and  1990s  trade  unions  became  a  subject  of  renewed 
interest for political scientists as their decline in most advanced industrial 
countries became increasingly apparent.  Scholars debated the crisis of 
unions  in  response  to  economic  internationalization,  economic 
restructuring,  and  de-industrialization,  but  most  of  these  studies  have 
taken  decline  as  a  given,  and  the  question  of  how  the  unions  have 
responded and adapted to these challenges has received little attention.  
One way that unions in Western Europe have responded to the challenges 
posed  by  economic  internationalization  and  the  declining  capacity  of 
national  governments  to  pursue  autonomous  policy  goals  has  been  to 
focus attention on the EU as potential buffer against the global economy.  
At  least  since  the  SEA  in  the  mid-1980s,  national  trade  union 
confederations  have  developed  European  strategies  as  a  way  of 
managing their domestic decline. 
 
But organized labor’s responses to European integration have diverged in 
important ways.  On the one hand, constructively-oriented unions like the 
TUC and the CGIL see the EU as a bulwark against decline.  For them, 
positive integration within the context of the EU is a source of benefits for 
European  workers.    The  TUC’s  General  Secretary  exemplified  this 
position in a 2005 address to the union’s annual congress, telling British 
workers: 
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Whatever threats there are of a new liberal agenda, this has not 
originated in the EU....  Crucial social advances have been won through 
Europe.  Social Dialogue is entrenched in Europe’s constitutions.  We 
should never forget that it is because of the EU that we have got new 
laws on equal pay, part time workers’ rights, four weeks’ paid holiday 
and much more besides.
89 
 
On the other hand, defensively-oriented unions like the CGT and the DGB 
see the EU as a part of the problem facing the unions rather than as a 
source of solutions.  Expressing this very different conception of the EU, 
Joël Decaillon, then-head of the CGT’s European department, wrote in the 
CGT’s largest-circulating journal, 
 
In this liberal and monetarist conception of Europe, the ‘social’ in general 
– employment levels, salaries, working conditions and social protections 
– have become liabilities that must be reduced at any price, since 
heightened competition gives such immense power to financial markets 
and multinational firms.
90 
 
This paper is an attempt to illuminate why two trade union organizations 
facing the same European-level developments can view the EU in such 
different  ways.    But  what  are  the  implications  of  these  different 
understandings of Europe?  Perhaps most importantly it spells trouble for 
the ETUC in attempting to speak and act on behalf of European workers. 
 
In  the  introduction  I  quoted  Ernst  Haas,  who  wrote  in  1958  that,  “the 
unions  have  no  alternative  but  to  unite  in  seeking  to  influence 
supranational  authorities.”    But  how  can  that  happen  when  national 
confederations pursue different goals and rely on different tactics?  
 
The ETUC has come a long way since its founding in 1973.  As the voice 
of some 60 million workers in Europe, its representative status is broad 
and  unchallenged.    Important  developments  over  the  1990s  gave  the 
ETUC new influence over EU policy-making, through the Social Dialogue, 
tripartite  concertation,  and  Commission  consultation.    Nevertheless,  the 
ETUC  faces  serious  challenges  as  it  moves  forward.    In  addition  to 
employers’ hesitance to negotiate and a lack of initiative on the part of the 
post-Delors Commission, there is the problem of the ETUC’s own internal 
diversity. 
 
Even  when  the  ETUC  does  have  the  opportunity  to  negotiate  social 
policies or when it is consulted by the Commission on its policy proposals 
– as has been required since Maastricht – the ETUC has real difficulties 
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speaking  with  one  voice.    National  union  confederations  continue  to 
disagree  over  which  policy  tools  (specifically,  initiatives  from  the 
Commission  or  negotiations  by  Social  Partners)  are  best  for  European 
social regulation.
91  Given the already high barriers to creating a social 
dimension within the EU, the inability of labor to concert its efforts poses a 
very real problem. 
 
The  widely  divergent  preferences  held  by  its  affiliates  over  European 
objectives  makes  it  very  difficult  for  the  ETUC  to  push  a  clear  and 
consistent  trade  union  agenda  at  the  European  level.    And  divergent 
preferences over the methods best suited to pursuing trade union interests 
also  create  tensions  within  the  ETUC.    The  ETUC  acquired  an 
institutionalized role in policy-making in the 1990s, but given the market-
based priorities of the EU, at least some of its affiliates, along with some 
academic observers, wonder if the ETUC isn’t tying its hands by linking 
the fate of the European labor movement so closely with the integration 
project.    Since  joining  the  ETUC  in  1999  the  CGT,  in  particular,  has 
pushed  for  greater  ETUC  mobilization.    As  discussed  above,  mass 
demonstrations organized by the ETUC have become a common feature 
over the past few years.  Some elements of the trade union movement, 
including the CGT, would like to read these developments as the birth of 
an activist transnational labor movement.  But the EU treaties explicitly 
leave legislation related to strikes and association rights in the hands of 
member  states,  and  that  reality  limits  the  potential  for  meaningful 
transnational action.  
 
As this paper shows, the labor movement in Europe is extremely diverse 
and has not been able to articulate a common European strategy, even 
within the ETUC.  Given the weak position of the unions vis-à-vis both 
employers and the political institutions of the EU, it is difficult to imagine 
labor making  any  fundamental  changes  in the nature of  the  integration 
project  in  the  absence  of  some  sort  of  common  vision  and  a  shared 
strategy for achieving it. 
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